

# PLANS OF GERMANY AND JAPAN TO INVADE THE UNITED STATES

Facts Upon Which Col. Roosevelt Based His Recent Sensational Statement  
—German Schemes of Attack Contemplate Landing of Forces  
on Long Island—Japan's Plan of Invasion

"I MYSELF have seen the plans of two of the countries now engaged in the European war to invade the United States, capture our greater cities and hold them for ransom, considering our standing army too small to be dangerous." So said Col. Theodore Roosevelt less than a month ago. Some persons promptly declared this statement to lack foundation in fact. It is, however, unquestionably true that Col. Roosevelt did see such plans, and he was probably informed at the same time of the inadequate arrangements which the American strategic experts had prepared for just such contingencies. What does the public imagine has been the object of certain combined maneuvers carried out jointly by the army and the navy in recent years? American naval and military attaches have gathered at foreign capitals suggestive material for the officers at the army and navy war colleges, and the defensive problems set for the maneuvers have had their inspiration in the secrets thus obtained abroad. Col. Roosevelt as President had ample opportunity to study these plans. Furthermore, it is a fact that at least one carefully studied project for an invasion of the United States has been made public.

All too accurately to be purely speculative prophecy, Gen. Friedrich von Bernhardi foretold the present conflict. It is reasonable to assume that he had access to the wealth of material filed away in the archives of the German Staff of the German army. But he is not the only member of that wonderful organization that has put his official studies within the reach of the general public. Another officer of the German General Staff has revealed something of the nation's purpose, and in the latter case the United States has been particularly dealt with as a possible field of attack.

Unfortunately, German technical pamphlets are not so widely read in this country as they should be, and this is particularly the case with those dealing with naval and military topics. A few years ago Capt. von Edelsheim of the German General Staff prepared a brochure entitled "Operationen Ueber See." It had not a wide circulation, but for both England and the United States there was plenty of reason for a hasty and earnest interest in what he wrote. Like von Bernhardi, Capt. von Edelsheim had carefully digested the material accessible to him, and his pamphlet revealed just what the Kaiser's strategists had in mind should trouble arise. There is no reason to believe that this little known officer is less deserving of credence than Gen. von Bernhardi. Capt. von Edelsheim brought American naval and military strategists face to face with a grave problem, and Col. Roosevelt had the situation called to his attention.

Quotations from this essay will disclose how near this German officer has come to the truth of our capacity here on the Atlantic coast to resist or repel an invasion carried out in the manner proposed by him. It is clear to everybody that the Kaiser's experts plan years ahead and modify their arrangements as it becomes necessary so that the details may harmonize with the march of events and mechanical developments. This is preparedness in the fullest sense of the term, and Capt. von Edelsheim's pamphlet is broadly as applicable today as it was when written a while back. Keeping this thought in mind, the following extracts tell their own story:


"The military commanders of the future will have to count the preparations for the execution of wars over sea among their most important tasks. There is no state in the whole world that possesses better forces and greater means than Germany for the enterprise of war by landing."

"In the first place the excellence and the readiness of our army and the certainty with which large masses of troops can be mobilized are not equalled by any other great Power. In the second place, Germany possesses the second largest commercial marine in the world and has in the rapid large steamships of her shipping companies a splendid transport fleet, the excellence of which is not exceeded even by that of England and herself, in the last place the increase and strengthening of our navy which is at present taking place will guarantee increased security to the transport of our troops over sea."

"The fact that which are peculiarly favorable for Germany's power, open a field for our world policy and render it possible for us to make our strong military forces also useful for the greatness of the empire and to secure by the development of German power over sea the same feared and esteemed position in the world which our victories of the last decades have earned for us in central Europe."

"A further stimulus in this direction is to be found in the fact that our navy will not be able at once to attain such development that it can alone solve all tasks which may have to be solved in an energetic world policy. Therefore it is desirable that the strength of our army should be made visible and available over sea to such nations as have been looked at Germany as an invader which they cannot be reached. Thus we must consider not only landings in conjunction with territorial wars but also operations against states which we reach only by sea."

"Operations over sea must not be postponed, because there is hope for success only when the whole combined mechanism down to the smallest details have been prepared in time. . . . When the landing has been effected in such a way that the opponent has been taken by surprise, and surprise is a vital element in such an undertaking, even a strong country will hardly succeed in concentrating sufficient forces in time whereupon to meet the invader. The preparations for landing operations must therefore be carried out in time of peace to such an



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extent that in time of war we feel sure of having the advantage.

"For operations over sea, a detailed plan of mobilization must be drawn up. In exactly the same way as is done for land operations. The troops which are to be mobilized must be determined in advance, their transport by railway, their harbor of embarkation and the preparations for embarkation must be prepared in order to insure the greatest celerity. As we have seen in the foregoing, it is before all necessary to proceed with a surprising quickness which alone can assure us success."

Capt. von Edelsheim says that either a harbor or a sheltered bay should preferably be chosen, but that the German General Staff must make provision for landing in force and with speed from the open sea. The part to be played by spies is amply indicated by the element of surprise and the fact that the point of landing must be chosen already explored before the beginning of the operations. So much for the suggestive prelude. Now we come to that part of his essay dealing with the United States, the preceding section having outlined the manner in which Germany should proceed in effecting a landing in the British Isles. Let it be said here that what follows shows the brochure was written some time after 1900.

"Operations against the United States of North America would have to be conducted differently from those against England. During recent years political friction between us and the United States, particularly in the commercial sphere, has not been lacking. Generally these have been settled by our giving way. This compliant attitude has its reasonable limits, and we must face the problem of finding a way to impose our will instead."

"Our fleet will be able to defeat the naval force of the United States, divide it between two oceans and widely separated. However, we must not rely by assuming that a victory over the American squadrons would suffice to compel the Americans, through their abundant resources, to sue for peace."

"In view of the limited fleet of American merchant ships, considering the moderate value of the colonial possessions of the United States, recognizing the strength of the coastal forts guarding the great seaports of the Atlantic which could not be taken except at a heavy sacrifice, and in view of the large number of American ports, but few of which we could blockade simultaneously, our fleet could not drive that country through successful sea action to conclude a peace on our terms."

"The possibility must be allowed for that the American squadrons will not give battle at first, but at the beginning of war might withdraw to the shelter of the fortified harbors, for the purpose of awaiting the best moment favorable to minor successes. Therefore it is plain that naval actions alone will not be decisive against the United States but that combined operations of the army and navy will be needed."

"Considering the great extent of the United States, the conquest of the country by an army of invasion is not possible. But there is every reason to believe that victorious enterprises on the Atlantic coast and the holding of the most important arteries through which imports and exports pass will create such an unbearable state of affairs in the whole country that the Government will readily offer acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace."

"If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our harbors we may conclude that operations on American soil can begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army equivalent to our own."

At this point Capt. von Edelsheim reviews the strength of the American

standing army and the available militia, and while his figures do not apply exactly to-day, unfortunately no really material difference has been effected by the intervening additions to both organizations.

"As an operation by surprise against America is impossible, on account of the length of time during which the transports are on the way, only the actual landing can be effected by surprise. Nevertheless stress must be laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably contribute to victory, owing to the absence of methodical preparations for mobilization to the experience of the personnel, and the experience of the numerical weakness of the regular army of the United States."

"In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the United States and to protect our lines of operations so as to enable us to fight successfully against all forces which the country in the course of time can oppose to us, considerable forces would be required. Such a campaign would be greatly hampered by the fact that a second passage of the transport fleet would be necessary in order to carry to America the needed troops. The long distance could be a serious obstacle to success. However, it seems debatable whether it could, after all, be to our advantage to occupy a great area of the country for a prolonged period."

"The Americans would not be inclined to seek peace because one or two States were dominated by our army of invasion. But, on the other hand, the same must be attained through the occupation of certain of the seaports. The enormous material losses thus inflicted upon the whole country, in which the fabric of the national welfare was affected, would accomplish the desired purpose."

"Accordingly, the work for our fleet would be to make a series of landings in this way: first, at the mercy of our guns several of the wealthy and important coastal cities. We should do this in a brief while. By destroying all buildings serving the State, commerce and the defence, by interrupting the various means of communication, by taking away all material for war and transport services, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the United States."

"For such enterprise a small military force will suffice and the American defence would find it difficult to meet his kind of warfare. True, there are well developed systems of railways making the concentration of troops possible within a short while at different points along the Atlantic coast, but even so these would not suffice until the point of the attack were known."

"Our purpose would be to stimulate attack by the squadrons of our fleet at various points, and then to land our army of invasion somewhere else sufficiently guarded by the bulk of our naval forces. The corps landed could either take the offensive against gathering hostile troops or withdraw to the transports in order to land at other places."

"It should be pointed out that Germany is the only great Power which is capable of battling with the United States single handed. England is strong enough to win on the sea, but she could not protect Canada, where the Americans would seek compensation for their losses abroad. Of the other great Powers not one of them possesses a fleet of transports required for such an overseas campaign. We stand alone in our dual strength in the combined forces of army and navy together with the merchant fleet of speedy liners for transport service."

Gen. Wood has recently described in The Six the peril of such an attack as Von Edelsheim has outlined. This country is unprepared in the matter of a sufficient force of soldiers either in the regular army or the organized militia. Yes, we have forts, to be sure, but

of these Major-Gen. J. P. Story, U. S. A., has said: "The sole function of these is to defend a port against direct naval attack. Against an enemy powerful enough to land the coast fort has no defensive value and may even prove an element of weakness." The late Lieutenant-General Adm. R. Chaffee, U. S. N., in his introduction to Homer Lea's book "The Valor of Ignorance," said: "The popular belief that the United States is free of opportunities for invasion is all 'tommyrot.' . . . No nation offers more numerous opportunities for invasion by a foreign nation than does the United States. . . . Every cause therefore is sufficiently great to induce preparations by any other nation that will beat aside our reliance on the sea. . . . Our mobile army is so ridiculously small in the world's war game that it amounts to nothing better than a discard." Gen. Homer Lea, that unique soldier of fortune, spent years in the Orient and had unusual facilities for finding out many things about the military purposes of Japan. As a patriotic duty, as he conceived it, he revealed some of these facts in his book, and both Gen. Chaffee and Gen. Story paid tribute to the military acumen of the author. Homer Lea showed how the Japanese would attack the Pacific coast, and here, again, Col. Roosevelt probably learned more intimate details than the author saw fit to publish.

Military problems are determined by topographical conditions and by the number of troops available and the existing facilities for their transport and subsistence. Homer Lea wrote his book five years ago. Since then nothing has changed in the human or mechanical phases of our strength to alter the force of his conclusions, and the topographical circumstances are unaltered. German influence moulded the armies of Japan which defeated Russia, and Capt. von Edelsheim's proposed overseas campaign does not differ fundamentally from what Lea tells us is the way in which the forces of the Mikado might undertake the conquest of the Pacific slope. He says:

"A war between Japan and the United States will be determined not by naval, but by land battles. Under the present military system this republic could not mobilize in any one place a field army of 15,000 regular soldiers in the same period of time that Japan could assemble, ready to take the field, 500,000 veteran troops. For the United States to enlist, equip and train to the same degree of efficiency a similar force would require no less than three years."

"Japan has such complete means of ocean transportation that she can move her vast armies to any portion of the Pacific with greater ease than Napoleon moved similar armies from Paris across the River Elbe or the Danube. . . . The Japanese Government possesses sufficient transportation facilities to carry in a single voyage, if necessary, more than two hundred thousand troops."

"The armed force of the United States in Hawaii will some day be 15,000 men, if all goes well. It is far below this figure to-day. Now read what Homer Lea says of these islands, which, reasonably, would constitute an advance base for Japan in attacking our Pacific coast: 'While the establishment of an American naval and military power in the Pacific or Hawaii has not been attempted, Japan has prepared herself in so effective a manner that, notwithstanding what the naval forces of the United States may be in the future, these islands can be seized from within and converted into a Japanese naval and military base so quickly that they will be impregnable to the power of this republic, regardless of what it may be on the mainland.'"

Japanese emigration has been in-

Continued on Second Page.

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
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